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 Capacity Payments and the Pricing of Reliability in
Competitive Generation Markets
Abstract: In restructured electric power industries
around the world, power pool designers have enabled gen-
erators to earn revenues consisting of energy and capacity
payments. This paper discusses uses and abuses of capac-
ity payments, and links provision of these payments to the
issue of pricing reliability. A general formula for deter-
mining the ideal capacity price in a generation supply sys-
tem is presented and the theoretical basis discussed.
Methods of achieving an ideal level of system reliability
through price-setting of capacity payments (in more regu-
lated markets) and through price discovery (in more com-
petitive markets) are contrasted. The paper concludes with
market design recommendations that could better realize
customer preference for reliability at prices customers are
willing to pay.
Keywords: Power generation reliability, Power genera-
tion economics, Power system reliability, Power system
economics, Power generation planning.
1. Introduction
In competitive power industries around the world, power
pool designers have enabled generators to earn revenue
based on energy production and on available capacity. The
latter revenue component is called a capacity payment in
this paper. Capacity payments have been frequently used
to compensate generators for improving reliability. These
payments are important revenue sources for generating
units that are scheduled to provide available capacity but
would more likely not be called to produce electricity. Pro-
visions for capacity payments have also been made out of
concern that generators would not recover investment
costs when only receiving energy payments from competi-
tive generation markets.
Provisions for capacity payments can be found in various
restructured energy and reliability reserve markets around
the world. For example, generators have earned capacity
payments through participation in the British, Spanish,
and PJM (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland) power
pools. Generators also earn capacity payments through
participation in reliability reserve markets operated by the
California Independent System Operator (CA ISO).
Although capacity payments are being offered in different
markets that vary by type and geographic region, the idea
behind these payments have been consistent in that the
payments 1) are based on capacity made available verses
energy actually supplied, and 2) provide sources of reve-
nue that by design compensate generators for the value
capacity adds to system reliability.
That capacity payments exist at all in many competitive
electric power industries indicates that sheer generation
capacity provides value even in the absence of generation.
The value of uncalled reserve capacity is basically
enhanced reliability. Available capacity in a power system
adds to system-wide reliability since excess capacity on
reserve lowers the probability and impact of an outage
event. Actual prices set for these payments directly impact
generator behavior in both the short and long run. Long
run capital investment decisions in turn influence genera-
tion supply reliability (in terms of adequacy [1]). Hence
prices offered for capacity in competitive markets ulti-
mately affect resulting system reliability.
Section 2 commences with a look at capacity payment
abuses that have surfaced in the British and California
electric power industries, respectively. Next, the paper pro-
vides a description of capacity payments under ideal con-
ditions. Section 4 presents a framework for assessing ideal
capacity payments rates in environments where prices are
administratively determined. There, the Value of Service
Reliability approach [6] is extended to derive capacity
prices that strike an ideal balance between investment
costs and reliability. In Section 5, the paper explores pur-
poses of capacity payments and links their provision to the
issue of pricing reliability within a system. Achieving an
ideal level of system reliability through price-setting (in
more regulated markets) and through price discovery (in
more competitive markets) are contrasted. The paper con-
cludes with recommendations on market design and pric-
ing schemes that could better realize customer preference
for reliability at prices customers are willing to pay.
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2. Problems Experienced with Capacity
Payments
2.1 British Experience
Concerns expressed prior to the onset of the deregulated
British system included uncertainties as to whether gener-
ating units could recover their investment costs via receiv-
ing only energy payments from the energy pool [2]. As a
result, a capacity revenue component was devised which
was to be paid to all units supplying available capacity in
the pool. The capacity element was set up to be partly
determined by generation system availability through a
loss of load probability (LOLP) measure, and partly deter-
mined by regulators through a decree on the value of loss
load (VOLL).
In a perfectly competitive environment, arguments for
capacity payments to augment energy payments may be
well founded. However, excessive market power com-
prised the actual British generation industry to begin with,
and abuses of capacity payments resulted. Generators
found early on that capacity payments were particularly
sensitive to the amount of spare capacity declared in the
pool [3]. The method used to compute LOLP exaggerated
the probability that plants would not be available, and led
to magnified capacity payments. Before the problematic
LOLP computation scheme was revised, generators could
mis-report unavailability and collect capacity payments
based on an invalid predication of scarce capacity. Even
after revision, rules for computing LOLP led to other per-
verse affects, such as encouraging generators under certain
circumstances to delay redeclaring availability after expe-
riencing a fault.
Such problems resulted in magnified capacity payments to
generators. During the 1994-95 financial year alone,
capacity payments were 20% of total payments for genera-
tion in the British pool [3]. The payments from that one
year would have paid for construction of 6% of total exist-
ing capacity. Therefore, the possibility of gaming by gen-
erators to influence capacity payments was very significant
in the British pool.
2.2 California Experience
Unlike the British pool, California auction markets for
energy contain no capacity component to compensate gen-
erators. Scheduling coordinators like the Power Exchange
(PX) only pay generators for scheduled energy. Capacity
payments, on the other hand, are awarded by the Indepen-
dent System Operator (ISO) to units that supply reserves
in one of four ancillary service markets. Separate markets
exist for regulation, spinning, non-spinning, and replace-
ment reserves, respectively. These auction markets pay
scheduled reserves according to market-clearing capacity
prices, regardless of whether energy is produced or not
from the reserves. So in contrast to the British pool, capac-
ity payments in California are primarily determined
through competitive auction mechanisms.
Nevertheless, California markets for reserves have not
always functioned competitively [11]. The markets have
exhibited extreme price volatility even under long periods
of unchanged demand. Prices for lower quality reserves
like replacement reserve have at times surpassed that of
higher quality reserves such as regulation. Moreover,
capacity prices in reserve markets have frequently
exceeded energy prices in the Power Exchange. Problems
with generator gaming on capacity bids have also been
experienced. For example, clearing prices for replacement
reserves reached $9999/MWh, the maximum price bid
acceptable by computer software, during certain hours of
the first summer of ISO operation. The ISO is rumored to
have spent millions for purchasing these reserves, com-
pared to $1500 if they had been procured under original
utility bid cap rates [12]. At the time of writing, the ISO
was imposing a $250/MWh price cap on all ancillary ser-
vices. Clearly, the evidence indicates that capacity reserve
markets have not functioned competitively in California.
3. Capacity Payments Under Ideal
Conditions
Ideal pricing for capacity reserves by definition achieves a
balance between economic efficiency and investment
incentives [3]. That is, prices must be kept close to costs
(if consumers are to benefit from the affects of competition
on prices), but not so low as to discourage investment (if
reliability is to be maintained over time). Both regulators
and designers of competitive markets alike commonly
strive to achieve such a balance within both traditional and
competitive market settings, respectively.
Competitive and regulated environments differ however in
the way prices are determined. In regulated environments,
regulators set prices; but in competitive environments, the
market does (or at least should). Thus in highly regulated
environments, the aim of administrators is to set prices that
approximate the ideal situation described above. Likewise
in competitive environments, the challenge to market
designers is to design market systems and mechanisms so
that the market (of buyers and sellers) approximates the
ideal on its own. In the next section, how to approximate
the ideal is examined within a regulated setting.
4. Value of Service Reliability
In this section, the VOS technique is applied towards
assessing a price for capacity that achieves an ideal bal-
ance between economic efficiency and proper investment
incentives (i.e., low costs verses enhanced reliability).
Proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2000
0-7695-0493-0/00 $10.00 (c) 2000 IEEE 2
4.1 Origins and Theory
The Value of Service (VOS) reliability technique is a reli-
ability evaluation approach designed by utilities for gener-
ation planning purposes [6]. The overall formulation
associated with the approach incorporates service costs
and customer valuations of reliability worth. By including
valuations on reliability worth into the planning formula-
tion, the VOS technique presented utilities with an analyti-
cal method for planning generation resource acquisition at
levels of reliability commensurate with customers’ will-
ingness to pay. At the time the technique was introduced,
regulators deemed the tool extremely innovative to the
utility planning process.1
The VOS technique was originally construed under a cen-
tralized planning paradigm. Consequently, responsibility
for implementing applications originally cited for the
approach typically belonged to the utility. These applica-
tions include determination of reliability requirements;
analysis of demand-side management programs; analysis
of utility-owned supply-side projects; optimal scheduling
of maintenance; evaluation of bulk power transactions;
and analysis of resource acquisitions issues [6].
In particular, generation planning based on VOS criterion
can be used to determine optimal levels of capacity expan-
sion and reliability for both utilities and their customers.
By definition, optimal expansion achieves an economic
balance between investment costs and reliability. Accord-
ing to the approach, optimality is achieved when capacity
acquisition is such that the marginal costs of additional
reserves is equal to the marginal benefit of the additions,
all evaluated at the margin.
4.2 Extension
Although the VOS technique was originally construed
under a centralized planning environment, it is applicable
to decentralized settings as well. The technique can be
used to determine a price for capacity reserves that
achieves an ideal balance between investment incentive (or
adequate reliability) and economic efficiency (or low elec-
tric energy costs) in competitive generation environments.
Indeed the authors of the approach had suggested that
VOS-based marginal capacity costs be used to calculate
non-utility generator payments. As an extension, this
paper shows how ideal capacity reserve prices can be com-
puted by reinterpreting marginal costs in the VOS
approach as prices. These resultant prices can be used as a
basis for determining capacity payment rates in central-
ized planning environments or other environments in
which common rates for capacity payments are set by reg-
ulators.
1.  comments on pp. 833-834 in [6]
4.3 Ideal Capacity Reserve Price
According to the VOS approach, an optimal amount of
capacity acquisition occurs when the marginal cost of
additional reserves is equal to the marginal benefit of all
additions. Analytically, the marginal benefit of a resource
addition in the amount of Xo MWe may be expressed as
 , (1)
where Xo is the total amount of additional capacity
resource acquired; R(Xo) is a reliability assessment on the
generation system resulting from additional capacity pro-
curement; and q(Xo ) represents customer outage costs in
$/MWh as a function of additional resource acquisition.
One may interpret the VOS optimality criterion on service
costs in a centralized setting to be a criterion on prices
offered for capacity reserves in a decentralized setting2.
Using this approach, price offered for capacity reserves
would equal the marginal benefit of capacity reserve addi-
tions acquired during the time period under consideration.
Thus according to the VOS criterion, the ideal price for
capacity payments is given by
 P(Xo) =  . (2)
Furthermore, the capacity reservation revenue of a genera-
tor supplying xoi MWe is the product of the resultant price
and the quantity of reserves supplied by the generator.
Explicitly, the revenue for a generating unit supplying xoi
MWe of capacity out of an industry total of Xo MWe is
P(Xo) xoi.
4.4 Computation
In order to compute the ideal capacity reserve price, a reli-
ability measure must be selected for use in the price com-
putation formula. Common measures on generation supply
adequacy include loss of load expectation (LOLE) and
expected unserved energy (EUE). EUE is the chosen reli-
ability measure in our example.
By substituting R(Xo) in Equation (2) with EUE(Xo) and
expanding the derivative of the product we obtain a for-
mula by which the ideal capacity price can be computed
from expected unserved energy:
 = (3)
2.  Under perfect competition, prices equal costs.
Xod
d R Xo( ) q Xo( )[ ]
Xod
d R Xo( ) q Xo( )[ ]
Xod
d EUE Xo( ) q Xo( )[ ]
q Xo( ) Xod
d EUE Xo( ) EUE Xo( ) Xod
d q Xo( )+
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where q(Xo ) is system-average customer outage cost and
EUE( Xo ) is expected unserved energy after additional
capacity procurement. EUE can be computed as part of the
area under the equivalent load duration curve resulting
from a particular convolution operation (See p. 171 in [7]).
In our application, EUE is computed as:
(4)
where Co is total initial capacity; Lpeak is peak system
load; ELDC0 is the final equivalent load duration curve of
the initial system; T is the duration of the time period
under consideration; and p is the forced outage rating
assumed on additional capacity procurement.
Substituting the above expression for EUE(Xo) into Equa-
tion (3) and taking the derivative, we arrive at the follow-
ing formula for computing ideal capacity price:
P(Xo) = (5)
 .
Assuming constant outage costs, the ideal capacity price
becomes
 P(Xo) =  , (6)
where Co, ELDC0, T, and p are as previously defined. A
detailed derivation of the first component of Equation (5)
is contained in the Appendix.
Generally, customer outage costs vary according to total
capacity acquisition. That is, in general q is a function of
Xo. However, assuming a constant rate on outage costs can
greatly simplify computation of capacity price. If we apply
this assumption, the latter pricing formula (6) can be
regarded as an approximation to (5).
Comparing the generalized and simplified pricing formu-
las, we note differences in computational requirements.
Since Equation (5) essentially contains the entire expres-
sion in Equation (6) plus an added term, the latter is more
simplistic to evaluate. Computation of (6) merely involves
evaluating the function ELDC0 at one value and comput-
ing a product. On the other hand, (5) has additional com-
putational requirements which are mainly embodied in the
extra term:
 .
Evaluating this term requires calculating EUE (i.e., per-
forming a convolution and integral operation), plus com-
puting a derivative and a product. In contrast, Equation (6)
does not necessitate computation of EUE nor any deriva-
tives and integrals. Therefore, utilizing the simplified for-
mula can significantly speed up computation of ideal
capacity price.
A trade-off for gains in speed, however, is a loss in accu-
racy stemming from the constant outage cost assumption.
In general, the flatter the marginal outage cost curve is at
the margin, the more negligible is the loss in accuracy.
4.5 Numerical Example
In Figure 1, a sample price curve for capacity reserves is
plotted as a function of total reserve acquisition. The curve
corresponds to the test system with parameters given in
Tables 1 and 2 for the case of constant average customer
outage costs. The test system was partially adapted from
[5].
Table 1:  Generating Units of Test System
Table 2: Test System Parameters
EUE Xo( ) =
T 1 p–( ) ELDC0 x( ) p ELDC0 x X0–( )+( ) xd
C0 X0+
C0 Lpeak X0+ +
T 1 p–( ) ELDC0 C0 Xo+( ) q Xo( )
EUE Xo( ) Xod
d q Xo( )+
T 1 p–( ) ELDC0 C0 Xo+( ) q
EUE Xo( ) Xod











1 nuclear 650 4 .05
1 coal 650 10 .04
1 oil 350 20 .02
2 oil 300 30 .02
1 gas turbine 200 50 .01
Total initial capacity Co 2450 MWe
Initial load duration curve IEEE Reliability Test System [10]
Duration of time period T 1 yr
Avg forced outage rate p 0.02
Avg customer outage cost q $3/Kwh
Fig.  1 Price Curve for Capacity Reserves
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4.6 Comparison with British Pool’s Capacity
Element
The proposed method for pricing capacity can shed some
analytical light on the scheme used in the British pool3 to
compensate generators for available capacity. Very inter-
estingly, there are close similarities between Equation (6)
and the formula that had been in use in the British power
pool to compute capacity payments. The capacity element
of the British pool purchase price is
. (7)
where LOLP is the loss of load probability at a given time;
VOLL is the value of loss load (an administratively
decreed value); and SMP is the system marginal price of
the pool at the time [8].
Comparing expression (7) against the formula derived in
Equation (6), we note similarities between terms. In Equa-
tion (6),  is actually a loss of load prob-
ability; namely, that of the generation supply system after
all capacity additions secured during the period in ques-
tion are considered. Similarly, the LOLP factor in expres-
sion (7) is based on the capacity availability situation of
the  poo l  a t  t he  t ime .  Thus  the  mean ing  o f  the
 factor of the first equation is equivalent
to the meaning of the LOLP factor of the British expres-
sion.
Similarly,  in expression (7) closely resem-
bles q from the VOS-derived formula. VOLL is considered
to be the maximum cost an average customer would be
willing to pay to avoid a service interruption [8]. Likewise
q in Equation (6) is a valuation on reliability worth mea-
sured in terms of customer outage costs. So both factors,
 and q, take into account costs associated
with loss of load events, and hence are related. The British
factor deducts SMP from VOLL to account for the fact that
all generating units that declare available capacity will
receive capacity payments on top of any energy payments
won in the British pool - the energy payments being based
on the SMP.
There are two factors, T and 1-p, remaining in Equation
(6) that do not appear in expression (7). These two ele-
ments serve to yield a more general formula for computing
capacity prices, by taking into account a general time
period and a reliability measure on capacity reserve acqui-
sitions. T, a time duration, converts energy into capacity
units; whereas p, an average forced outage rating on
reserve acquisitions, is unit-less. If the SMP is based on
hourly dynamics, then the implicit time duration in the
British expression would be one hour. However, lack of a
3.  The British pool has since dissolved. Thus, the pricing
method described in this subsection is no longer in use.
forced outage measure in the British expression indicates
an assumption of perfect availability on all declared capac-
ity.
In summary, the LOLP/VOLL scheme once utilized by the
British system for computing capacity prices contains sim-
ilar components to Equation (6). Both techniques for com-
puting capacity prices factor in a reliability measure and
an estimate on reliability worth for the generation system
in question. However, whereas prices for capacity were
administratively decreed in the British system (thereby
necessitating blind acceptance from participating genera-
tors), the VOS-based method is theoretically based and
provides a framework for determining ideal capacity pay-
ment rates. VOS methodology also provides an analytical
method of assessing whether a proposed pricing scheme
approximates an ideal cost and reliability balance within a
system.
4.7 Limitations of Approach
Although the VOS technique provides a sound theoretical
basis by which ideal rates for capacity payments may be
computed, the method is also limited in applicability.
The method assumes a regulatory price-setting environ-
ment for setting capacity payment rates. Therefore, the
proposed method is applicable to only those systems in
which capacity prices are administratively determined,
such as the British pool. The technique can not be applied
in markets like the CA ISO-operated reserve markets in
which prices are determined via auctions.
Futhermore, full power of the VOS approach to address
individual customer preferences has not yet been realized.
The formula derived in Section 4.4 is based on the use of
system-wide averages for 1) customer outage costs and 2)
forced outage rates of capacity resource additions. There-
fore, within the basic VOS model all customers pay for
and receive the same level of system reliability. Conse-
quently, the proposed pricing scheme induces capacity
resource acquisitions at levels that optimize for the aver-
age customer.
4.8 Reliability Worth Assessment Requirement
Like the British capacity element, the proposed method of
determining ideal capacity prices depends on access to
reliability worth information. Data on worth directly fac-
tors into capacity price through the outage cost term q. So
application of VOS-based capacity prices presumes fairly
accurate estimations on reliability worth.
Various ways of determining reliability worth exist across
electric power industries. Traditionally, utilities conducted
customer surveys to evaluate reliability worth by estimat-
ing customer outage costs. [6] mentions several ways of
LOLP VOLL SMP–( )
ELDC0 C0 Xo+( )
ELDC0 C0 Xo+( )
VOLL SMP–
VOLL SMP–
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measuring customer outage costs. They include: proxy
methods that indirectly measure outage costs; market-
based methods that examine actual customer behavior in
response to service options; after-the-fact measurement
methods that quantify impacts of actual outages; and sur-
vey methods which tabulate customer responses to hypo-
thetical outage scenarios. There are also other engineering
and market-based methods for establishing a value on reli-
ability worth. In particular, [8] details a proposal for evalu-
ating VOLL that relies on customer surveys, and [9]
describes a methodology that also relies on customer sur-
veys for electric service reliability worth evaluation. Reli-
ability worth may also be reflected through payment terms
contained in long term contracts held by reliability must-
run generating units (like those contracted with the ISO).
Regardless of the method of estimation, it should be
understood that any reliability worth evaluation technique
offers merely an estimate on the value of reliability within
a particular service area. Also, since valuation on reliabil-
ity worth is system dependent, any data used in estima-
tions should originate from the particular service area in
question. Furthermore, because actual outage costs,
VOLL, and other measures of reliability worth depend on
many factors including geography, weather, outage dura-
tion, cause of outage, etc., evaluation of reliability worth
can be a nontrivial requirement.
4.9 Difficulties of Applying in Practice
The complexity of assessing reliability worth is one source
of difficulty in administratively determining ideal capacity
prices. Another source of difficulty involves assessing a
value on system reliability itself. From Equation (6), the
reader will note that VOS-prescribed capacity prices, like
British capacity prices, are dependent on the respective
values of reliability worth and system reliability used in
the analyses. However, the time-varying nature of system
reliability can lead to complications in making accurate
estimates. The difficulties involved in assessing system
reliability will be expanded on next.
Generation system reliability may be expressed in terms of
loss of load probability, or other established reliability
measures like expected unserved energy (EUE) and loss of
load expectation (LOLE). Regardless of the measure cho-
sen, reliability is directly affected by capacity availability
amongst all generating units in a particular system at a
given time.
Because of the time-varying nature of available capacity,
complications can arise from performing apriori reliability
assessments. For example, in the British pool LOLP is the
chosen reliability measure that capacity prices are based
on. To establish price certainty, LOLP values are com-
puted apriori and based on availability declarations of gen-
erating units participating in the pool.  However,
computing LOLP apriori led to gaming in the British pool
early on, as generators sought to improve on capacity pay-
ments. As already discussed, mis-reporting availability led
to abuses of capacity payment provisions and non-ideal
results.
Generally, price-setting schemes that utilize measures of
reliability to compute compensation terms will encounter
difficulties in practice. The underlying problem is that
information reported apriori to assess reliability may not
necessarily reflect actual outcomes. This problem is aug-
mented by the possibility of gaming among generators that
have an incentive to mis-report information. Nevertheless,
the need to establish price certainty for capacity payments
necessitates making apriori estimates on system reliability.
In conclusion, the difficulty of accurately assessing system
reliability is another problem associated with setting
capacity payment rates administratively.
5. Capacity Payments for Pricing Reliability
5.1 Uses of Capacity Payments
Capacity payments have been discussed as common mech-
anisms in various pools for compensating generators rec-
ognized to serve a reliability purpose. Why else have these
payments become prevalent in competitive generation
markets, and what other purpose can they serve?
Provision of capacity payments serve to hedge risks inher-
ent in energy production and plant investment by provid-
ing valuable price signals and incentives [3]. A generator
may for example estimate likely capacity payments ahead
of time and predict whether a unit will cover its costs from
participating in an auction and receiving the capacity
price. Furthermore, a history of high capacity prices will
act as incentives for additional generation investment and
participation in capacity reserve markets. By providing
these signals and incentives, capacity prices in turn shape
system reliability. High anticipated prices should induce
more supply offerings and thus reinforce reliability.
In addition, capacity prices established through price dis-
covery in competitive auctions can address a key question
inherent in traditional power industries; namely, the ques-
tion of what reliability is worth to individual customers. A
consumer’s willingness to pay a certain price for capacity
reserves directly reveals how much the consumer values
reliability. Likewise, clearing prices in auctions for capac-
ity reserves can indicate how reliability is valued by an
aggregated market of consumers and suppliers, respec-
tively. In such ways, capacity prices can signal the worth
of reliability in a system.
Because they signal the worth of reliability as well as
influence resulting system reliability, capacity prices for
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reserves are related to the price of reliability. Given neces-
sary technological innovations and market design mecha-
nisms are in place, capacity prices can serve to efficiently
price reliability as well as accurately reveal what reliabil-
ity is worth in a system. More discussion on realizing this
possibility is given below.
5.2 Price-Setting Verses Price Discovery
Market designers in power industries undergoing restruc-
turing face a choice between instilling mechanisms that
rely on price-setting by regulatory entities or implement-
ing competitive market mechanisms that enable price dis-
covery. As discussed in Section 4.9, environments of the
former are prone to gaming on reported information. In
light of this characteristic plus the general difficulty of
estimating values for reliability and reliability worth,
price-setting appears an inferior mechanism to price dis-
covery. Rather, price discovery mechanisms could more
accurately reveal what reliability is worth to an industry.
The information in turn is needed to induce a better bal-
ance between economic efficiency and reliability in com-
petitive generation markets.
5.3 Market Design Recommendation
The ability to discover what reliability is worth through
capacity reserve markets is an advantage of market designs
that enable price discovery over those that rely on regula-
tory price-setting. For capacity prices to directly reveal
reliability worth in competitive markets, necessary techno-
logical and market mechanisms need to be in place. Con-
sumers would need a way to individually express their
preference for service reliability in a way that influences
actual demand. This ability could be realized by widely
allowing consumers to bid into capacity reserve auctions,
within which they can express their preference for reliabil-
ity at prices they are willing to pay. Moreover, consumers
should not be shielded from costs paid for procuring ser-
vice reliability. The prices that consumers see and directly
pay should include service reliability costs, if demand for
reserves is expected to be responsive to the costs of pro-
curing them.
Demand-side bidding gives consumers an audible voice
regarding their preferences for electricity at whatever level
of service desired. For example, demand-side bidding for
reserves would enable consumers to reveal how they indi-
vidually assess the importance of not having their electric-
ity curtailed, and at what prices they are willing to
experience a degradation in continuity of service.
California and other regional systems have yet to widely
implement such provisions for demand-side bidding in
auctions for reserves. For example, in the California sys-
tem the demand curve [4] for reserves is very inelastic;
resembling a vertical line that intersects the aggregate sup-
ply curve of units bidding reserves. The inelasticity can
lead to a situation of quantity demanded that exceeds total
supply bid into auction, as has been experienced in Cali-
fornia’s reserve markets [11]. Introduction of more elastic-
ity to the demand curve for reserves would ameliorate this
problem, by allowing capacity payments to better reflect
customer valuation on service reliability. So the facilita-
tion of wide consumer participation in double-sided auc-
tions for reserves could help mitigate the problems
experienced in California ancillary service reserve mar-
kets.
6. Conclusion
The value of uncalled capacity in essence is enhanced reli-
ability. Capacity reserves serve to reduce the probability of
loss of load events as well as lessen the impacts of out-
ages. Provisions of capacity payments and attempts to
carefully design these payments have been linked in the
discussions to the issue of pricing reliability.
In traditional utility environments in which centralized
investment planning is conducted, planners may utilize the
Value of Service Reliability method detailed in this paper.
The VOS technique provides a theoretical basis by which
optimal capacity prices can be determined. The technique
was used to explain how ideal capacity prices might be
determined in environments where they can be administra-
tively set. However, there are difficulties in utilizing the
VOS technique in practice, due to requirements on esti-
mating values for reliability and reliability worth that are
needed in the analyses.
In more competitive environments, a choice is offered
between price discovery and price-setting mechanisms for
determining capacity payment rates. The former, price dis-
covery, could better reveal what reliability is worth to an
industry, and in turn help induce a greater balance between
economic efficiency and reliability in a system. However,
to better discover the value of reliability through competi-
tive markets, facilitation of double-sided reserve auctions
and other mechanisms that promote consumer responsive-
ness to prices is recommended.
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